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Domestic and international factors may combine to stimulate change in US agricultural 
policies and reductions in the costs of support. This would create additional pressures for 
economic adjustment in the sector. Current U.S. agricultural policies are not oriented to 
facilitating such adjustment. A trade adjustment program for agriculture, recently 
included as part of U.S. trade legislation, continues the traditional focus on income 
support. We discuss the reorientation of existing agricultural policies to facilitate 
economic adjustment resulting from the reform of domestic agricultural and trade 
policies. We focus on measures to address three key areas: 1. asset value reductions; 2. 
human capital issues; and 3. persistent poverty. Estimates of costs suggest that after an 
initial period, during which compensation for reductions in asset values would be made, 
the ongoing costs of an active adjustment policy for agriculture would be substantially 
lower than existing programs. 
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A combination of domestic and international factors may combine to create pressure for 
change in U.S. agricultural policies. In recent years, the United States has moved from a position 
of relative fiscal balance to one of substantial deficit. In the early 1990s, similar budgetary 
problems led to modifications in agricultural programs aimed at reducing government 
expenditures. Currently, negotiations are underway through the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) on liberalizing agricultural trade. A final agreement will likely require a reduction in 
import protection and will impose greater discipline on government support expenditures. 
Changes in current agricultural policies in response to these domestic and international factors 
would intensify adjustment pressures in the U.S. agricultural sector. It may be necessary to take 
action to aid the adjustment process in order to facilitate policy reform.  
 
While considerable debate may be generated about the need for government action, three 
areas have been identified in the economics literature as potentially providing a justification for 
policy measures that aid economic adjustment: 1. efficiency; 2. equity; and 3. political economy 
(Richardson 1982). The efficiency argument centers on losses created when factors are 
potentially mobile but market failure (due to imperfect information, incomplete markets or 
imperfect competition) prevents their reallocation. Corrective action is justified if its costs are less 
than the value of additional output generated by improved factor allocation. The equity argument 
centers on compensation for private costs and redistributive effects when factor endowments 
differ across individuals. Classical welfare economics suggests that society as a whole will 
benefit from a policy change if gainers can potentially compensate losers and still be better off. 
The political economy argument centers on the fact that losers may apply political pressure to 
block change and that compensating payments may be needed to overcome their opposition. It 
may be argued that all three of these areas apply to agriculture, and provide a justification for an 
active approach to adjustment in the sector. 
 
In this paper, we explore some options for an active adjustment policy for U.S. 
agriculture. In the first section, we provide a brief review of existing policies, with particular 
emphasis on elements oriented towards facilitating adjustment. To bring the issues into sharper 
focus, we then discuss the likely initial impact of a policy change involving a reduction in 
support, note the associated market adjustments, and identify particular target groups for 
adjustment policy. Finally, we offer suggestions for the future direction of adjustment policy for 
agriculture, dealing specifically with measures to address reductions in farm asset values, human 
capital issues, and persistent poverty. 
 
U.S. POLICIES AND AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
 
In common with many industrial countries, the dominant and enduring focus of U.S. 
agricultural policy has been on price and income support for farmers. With the exception of the 
Resettlement Administration that pioneered explicit farm-level adjustment activities in the 1930s 
and some modestly funded rural development initiatives, little emphasis has been placed on 
facilitating or promoting adjustment by the agricultural sector to changing economic conditions.
2 
Production controls were used for major crops, such as corn and wheat, and import restrictions 
are used for commodities, such as milk and sugar, to keep domestic prices above world levels and 
to limit government expenditures. 
 
Beginning with the Food Security Act of 1985, there was a gradual shift away from 
production controls and price supports as the primary instrument of policy for crops and towards 
the increasing use of direct payments. This culminated in the Federal Agriculture Improvement 
and Reform Act of 1996, which replaced the previous system of deficiency payments with direct   3
payments that were largely decoupled from current plantings. A declining schedule of payments 
was established for the latter part of the period covered by the Act (1999-2002), holding open the 
possibility of their eventual elimination. The legislation also foresaw the end of the price support 
program for dairy products. There were no explicit provisions for facilitating the adjustment that 
would be required as a result of this policy reorientation.  
 
The changes foreseen in the 1996 Act never materialized. A decline in market prices 
(linked in no small measure to the appreciation of the U.S. dollar) and the emergence of a Federal 
budget surplus prompted Congress to authorize substantial increases in subsidies for farmers. 
Expenditures in fiscal year 2002 reached a record high of almost $23 billion. The current 
legislation, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, formalized the return to large 
subsidies. Producers of major crops are eligible for price supports (marketing loans), fixed direct 
payments, and counter-cyclical payments (triggered when prices fall below pre-determined 
levels). Previous price support programs for milk and sugar remain in place. Preliminary figures 
for 2003 indicate that of the roughly $17.4 billion of government payments to agriculture, nearly 
87 percent ($15.1 billion) was paid out in various forms of price and income support, with the 
balance for conservation payments. This figure, however, understates the total transfers to 
farmers attributable to price and income support, because it does not include programs, like those 
for dairy products and sugar, that keep domestic prices above those in world markets by 
restricting import competition.  
One notable departure from a return to the status quo in the current legislation is in the 
program for peanuts. Production controls have been eliminated, and the same types of price and 
income support mechanisms are now used as for other program crops. The legislation also 
authorized compensation for former holders of peanut production quotas for the loss of quota 
values created by changes in the program. In so doing, its was explicitly recognized that a 
reduction in the value of agricultural assets (in this case, the right to grow peanuts) is a key 
adjustment issue associated with policy reform. 
While the adjustment components of U.S. agricultural and related policies have been 
limited, a more active approach has been embodied in measures that address the effects of trade 
policy liberalization.  Trade adjustment assistance (TAA) provisions have been an enduring 
characteristic of U.S. legislation since the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, which provided 
presidential authority for the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations (see Annex). The current 
Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002 provides supplemental unemployment 
compensation to workers displaced by international competition, and assistance for retraining and 
relocation. There is a modest program of assistance for firms. The Act also contains a TAA 
program for farmers run by the Department of Agriculture.
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In keeping with the focus of agricultural policies in the United States, the TAA program 
for farmers is a supplementary income support program. Unlike TAA for workers, which is 
linked to retraining and encourages relocation, there is a minimal active adjustment component. 
Adjustment consultation through the extension service is required, but no specific action, for 
example, a change in existing activities, a switch to alternative activities or additional training, is 
mandated as a result of that consultation. The active adjustment component of the program for 
farmers is therefore relatively weak.  
 
In summary, few components of U.S. agricultural policies have been designed to 
facilitate adjustment to changing economic circumstances. Trade Adjustment Assistance 
programs have taken a more active approach to adjustment, particularly for hired labor. TAA   4
provisions recently introduced for agriculture focus on the provision of direct payments to 
compensate for reductions in prices attributable to increased international competition.  
 
ADJUSTMENT POLICY FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE 
 
Despite attempts to embrace agricultural adjustment through modifications to trade 
adjustment legislation, we believe that current policies fail to address key issues likely to arise 
with the reform of existing agricultural policies. One of the major limitations is that trade 
adjustment programs focus primarily on wage labor. While that may be useful for addressing the 
displacement of labor in industries that are upstream or downstream from the farm, at least in as 
far as such displacement is associated with changes in trade policies, current programs are not 
designed to address adjustment issues for the farm household firms that dominate U.S. 
agriculture.  
 
To formulate an approach to adjustment policy at the farm level we must examine the 
potential impact of reforming existing agricultural policies, specifically reducing the amount of 
price and income support that these provide. To varying degrees, the rationale for specific 
recommendations draws heavily on the efficiency, equity, and political economy justifications for 
adjustment policy identified at the beginning of the paper. 
 
Tracing the impact of policy reform 
 
Current U.S. agricultural policies generate significant transfers to farmers. Support is 
provided directly through various types of government payments and indirectly through 
government policies that raise consumer prices or lower production or marketing costs. In recent 
years, direct payments have varied between $11 and 23 billion per year (table 1). According to 
OECD estimates, the total cost of support that can be directly linked to individual commodities 
has varied from roughly $40-$56 billion per year in the United States.  
 
Not all of this support translates into extra income for producers. The transfer efficiency 
of support is likely to be substantially less than 100 percent because of efficiency losses in 
production and consumption (Blandford and Dewbre, 1994). However, some of the support will 
translate into extra income. It has been further argued that much of the additional income is 
eventually reflected in higher prices for fixed assets in agriculture – particularly land (e.g., Floyd, 
1965).   
 
For at least the past half century, many policy economists, price and trade analysts, 
production economists, and others have documented how these policy transfers have affected the 
agricultural sector. Their analyses have been both simple and complex, and the conclusions vary 
in degree, and sometimes even in direction. However, all, we are sure, would resist the temptation 
to argue that the impact of gradual reductions or the eventual elimination of domestic support 
could be described by the symmetric reversal of the effects precipitated by the persistence of the 
policy intervention. The reasons for asymmetric response within the sector even to rather short-
term changes in price, etc. are well known, and have solid foundations in notions such as asset 
fixity (Edwards, 1959; Hathaway, 1963), an agricultural treadmill (Cochrane, 1965) and our 
understanding of the process of technological adoption in agriculture that has its origins in the 
work by Griliches (1957).  
 
For these, and other reasons, the impact of a reduction in domestic agricultural support 
must be viewed within the context of the dramatic and continual changes in the structure of 
production agriculture and changes in the structure of agricultural output and input markets, many   5
of which are in response to the advance of agricultural technology and the persistence in farm 
support legislation. Adjustment will also be affected by changes in the demographics of 
agricultural households and their increased reliance on off-farm income. Changes elsewhere in 
the economy are also important, particularly the increased competition for land and water by non-
agricultural users.  
 
Anyone attempting to understand the detailed impact on agriculture of a reduction in 
domestic support in an industrialized country is likely to confront this same level of complexity. 
However, as was seen in several papers at an earlier workshop, the general direction and 
magnitude of adjustments in countries, that have reduced domestic support for all of agriculture 
or for specific commodities, are generally consistent with straightforward economic reasoning 
(Harris, 2003; Rae et al., 2003; Doan et al., 2003; Hallberg, 2003). By taking a stylized view of 
the adjustment process, as reflected in figure 1, we are able to distinguish the initial impact of a 
policy change involving a reduction in support, from associated adjustments in product and factor 
markets, and finally, identify particular groups to which adjustment policy might be targeted.  
 
As reflected in the figure, the immediate impact in domestic support will likely be a 
reduction in current agricultural income, particularly if support is reduced unilaterally. To the 
extent that output markets react to the reduction in support, price changes (higher output prices) 
may partially offset the impact of the support reduction on net income. Such effects are more 
likely if support reductions are multilateral. Markets for purchased inputs may experience similar 
adjustments, if a reduction in input demand leads to a decline in variable input prices. To the 
extent that they are not impeded by transactions costs of various descriptions, these adjustments 
will lead to improvements in market efficiency.  
 
The potential impact of a reduction in domestic support on the agricultural land market is 
arguably considerably more complex, as are the implications for adjustment assistance. For 
example, whatever its final magnitude, a reduction in agricultural income will ultimately affect 
the returns to fixed assets used in agriculture, particularly land. As lower returns are reflected in 
the price of land, landowners will experience a reduction in wealth. Furthermore, since the users 
of farmland are not necessarily the owners of that land, the income of farm operators will be 
affected by how rapidly rental rates for farmland adjust to the reduction in its value. It is for this 
reason that we must distinguish separate target groups for adjustment assistance as land values 
fall when domestic support is reduced (figure 1). Clearly the wealth and income positions of 
landlords, farm operators that own much of their land, and farm operators that rent most of their 
land will be affected differently. A key factor for the impact of asset value adjustment on each of 
these groups stems largely from the demographics of farmland owners—their stage in the 
lifecycle and the relative importance of non-farm sources of household income and wealth.  
 
From figure 1, it is also clear that adjustments will occur in the rate of entry and exit of 
farms and farm operators from the sector. For those operators wishing to remain in agriculture, 
some will need no assistance to remain competitive, while others might survive if they are able to 
enhance their business skills in order to compete effectively in a more market-oriented 
environment. For those farm operators that either decide to leave farming, or are forced to do so, 
the need for adjustment assistance clearly depends on whether they must make a transition to 
another type of employment, or they are at an age where retirement is a realistic alternative.   
 
Three essential components of adjustment policy 
 
  Viewed in terms of the simple representation in figure 1, there would seem to be three 
essential components to a policy to facilitate adjustment to reductions in domestic agricultural   6
support. These components include compensation for reductions in asset values; measures to 
improve the quality of human capital or to facilitate its reallocation; and payments to address any 
persistent poverty problem in agriculture that remains following policy reform. With the 
exception of the adjustments that will naturally occur in commodity markets and markets for 
purchased inputs, which can be justified in large measure in terms of increased efficiency, the 
justifications for these three essential components derive also from equity and political economy 
considerations.  
 
Since there are likely to be farmers that potentially qualify for all three components, it 
would be essential that the adjustment measures be well coordinated. While some adjustment 
initiatives might be accommodated through an expansion of existing TAA legislation, other 
components will be new. For purposes of efficiency and coordination, it seems preferable that 
these new adjustment mechanisms be implemented as part of future farm legislation. As seen 
below, it would seem natural to accommodate any compensation for reductions in asset values 
within such legislation. This could also be important in providing a safety net to low-income 
farmers to avoid the stigma felt by many rural residents of participation in more general income 
assistance programs. Current programs under the TAA legislation and the USDA could be a 
starting point for developing programs to enhance the human capital of farmers looking to remain 
in agriculture or find alternative employment, and it might also be preferable to develop these 
through future farm legislation.      
 
Compensation for Reductions in Asset Values 
  
  Except for the compensation of the holders of peanut quotas for loss in value, there have 
to our knowledge been no previous attempts to compensate owners of U.S. farm assets for losses 
in value due to a change in policy. To gain some idea of how such an adjustment provision might 
work, we must examine recent trends in agricultural land prices and the extent to which past 
program benefits are reflected in these prices.  
 
U.S. farmland prices have increased substantially in recent years (figure 2). From 1990 to 
2003, the average price of U.S. farmland rose by an average of 6.6 percent per year. That may be 
compared with a rate of increase in U.S. producer prices (all commodities) of 1.4 percent, and 
U.S. consumer prices (urban consumers) of 3.1 percent. The rapid increase in farmland prices is 
not entirely due to developments in the agricultural sector, although these have undoubtedly 
played a part. Particularly significant in some areas is the growing demand for land for non-
agricultural uses (e.g. land for housing and urban/suburban development at the rural-urban 
fringe).  
 
In other areas, some land previously used in agriculture is valued for its contribution to 
wildlife habitat, biodiversity, erosion control, or other components of environmental quality, and 
farmers are paid to keep this land out of agricultural production through the wetlands reserve and 
conservation reserve programs. It is unlikely that these kinds of payments will be reduced along 
with other types of domestic support, and as some would argue, they might well be increased over 
time as the public throughout the industrialized world places higher and higher values on these 
non-market goods (Blandford et al., 2003). Given that one of the major original objectives of the 
conservation reserve was to reduce surplus supplies, especially of corn (Cochrane and Runge, 
1992), even with current provisions that evaluate the potential environmental benefits of land 
offered for enrolment, it is unlikely that the program is designed optimally. If such programs were 
to continue and be justified solely the basis of environmental contributions, their design would 
need to be re-examined as adjustment in the sector unfolds in response to reductions in domestic 
support.      7
 
With respect to that support, empirical analysis yields mixed results on the pass through 
of commodity program benefits to land values. Using county data for 1950-92, Gardner (2003) 
found only weak support for a positive relationship. Using farm-level data for 1998-2000, 
Goodwin et al. (2003) find a positive effect, differing by type of payment and by region. Using 
the same data set, Barnard et al. (2002) derive an estimate of the total impact of farm program 
payments on cropland values of $62 billion, with nearly two-thirds of this being concentrated in 
the “Heartland” region of the Midwest (table 2).
4 Since much of the land involved is rented, the 
primary beneficiaries are landlords. For the United States as a whole, 62 percent of that land is 
owned by non-operator landlords. These same authors argue that a rapid transmission of changes 
in program payments to land owners is made through changes in land rental rates. Goodwin et al. 
(2003) estimate that 60 percent of a given change in payments is passed through to landowners in 
one year. Barnard et al. also note that “many non-operator owners are retired farmers, their 
survivors, or others formerly directly associated with agricultural production.”
5 This, combined 
with the fact that benefits from current program are concentrated geographically, may well add 
weight to the potential political importance of providing compensation to individuals affected by 
a reduction in price and income support. 
 
Using the estimates derived by Barnard et al., data on total support from the OECD, and 
estimates of the transfer efficiency of payments also from the OECD, we derive a rough estimate 
of the total capitalized value of the support generated by U.S. agricultural programs of $109 
billion (table 3).
6 In 2002, the total value of U.S. farm real estate was estimated to be roughly 
$1.3 trillion. The estimated capitalization of support payments is therefore equivalent to less than 
10 percent of the value of U.S. farmland, and slightly more than the $103 billion of outstanding 
farm real estate debt in 2002. By way of further comparison, the estimated capitalization of 
support is equivalent to six times the average annual direct payments made under government 
programs for the past six years and slightly more than twice the average annual value of total 
government support as estimated by the OECD. 
 
Any significant reform of U.S. agricultural policies is likely to require the phased 
elimination of current price and income supports. This could be accompanied by a series of 
annual asset value compensation payments to land owners. Various options could be explored, 
but the simplest would seem to be one in which one payment rate would be set per acre for land 
in program crops, and a second rate for land devoted to other products. The area upon which 
compensation would be paid could be the base acreage established under current legislation for 
program crops, and the average area in production during a recent time period for other crops 
such as sugar. To the extent that farmland rental rates may be less flexible on the downside than 
on the upside, appropriate reductions in rental rates may have to be required as a condition for 
landlords to receive payments for loss in farmland value.   
 
Compensation for the loss in value of the fixed assets of livestock producers, particularly 
dairy, presents greater challenges since it is difficult to identify the area of land upon which 
compensation would be based. In the short-run, changes in milk prices are reflected in market 
prices for dairy cattle and their replacements. Over the longer-term, it is likely that the value of 
government support will be reflected both in the value of land used to keep dairy cattle and to 
raise replacements, particularly in parts of the upper Midwest and the Northeast where dairy 
production is the best use of the land. Given the difficulty of identifying the appropriate land base 
on which payments could be made, it may be necessary to adopt a blended approach to 
compensation with a payment linked to the number of dairy cows and replacements for individual 
operators in a recent base period, and one based on land in pasture and forage production.
7 We   8
recognize that such a blended compensation scheme may result in over-compensation to some 
individuals and under-compensation to others. 
 
  In conclusion, we might note that the value of farm assets accounts for a declining 
proportion of the total wealth of U.S. farm households. USDA data indicate that nonfarm net 
worth of the average farm household increased from 15 percent of the total in 1993 to 31 percent 
in 1999 (Mishra et al. 2002). While this means that fluctuations in the value of farm assets has 
less of an impact on farm households than in the past, it is difficult to believe that policy-induced 
changes would not generate strong pressures for offsetting action.  
 
Human Capital Issues  
 
The reform of agricultural policy would place new demands on the managerial ability of 
U.S. farmers. Some may need assistance in restructuring their farm operations to reduce costs and 
increase profitability. Others may decide to exit agriculture altogether.  
 
It is difficult to know a priori how many farmers would fall into each category. However, 
some initial estimates might well be made by classifying farm operators similar to the groups 
typically identified by economic researchers to distinguish among farms that adopt new 
technology or employ other types of production and management innovations. Diederen et al. 
(2003), for example, assign farms to four groups: innovators; early adopters; late adopters; and 
non-adopters on the basis of behavioral characteristics of farmers. A slightly different 
categorization might be appropriate for identifying needs for adjustment assistance, but clearly, it 
is the farmers in the first (or similarly defined) group that would make the transition to a more 
market-oriented economy without any assistance. The transition might also be quite easy for 
many in the second group. It is farmers in the latter two groups that would be most likely to need 
assistance to exit agriculture. Whether or not they would prepare to make the transition to 
alternative employment or into retirement would depend largely on age, wealth, and other 
lifecycle considerations. Depending on the structure of their assets, the wealth of some of these 
farmers would, in turn, be affected by compensation for loss in land values mentioned above. 
 
Regardless of the numbers of farmers in each group, the current adjustment assistance 
program seems of limited use for several reasons. First, the program is limited to adjustments 
resulting from trade policy changes, whereas changes in domestic agricultural policies could be of 
much greater significance for adjustment in agriculture. Second, the program is primarily 
designed to aid the adjustment of hired labor – the provisions for firm-level adjustment are weak 
and much of the adjustment in agriculture will involve adaptation in both farm and non-farm 
activities by farm-firm households. Finally, the current provisions for agriculture, which focus on 
supplementary income compensation, fail to address farm-level adjustment, a substantial part of 
which will require improved financial management and planning. 
 
What limited Federal activity there is in this area is funded through the USDA. The farm 
and financial training courses are supported through the Farm Service Agency (FSA), and risk 
management education activities are supported by the Risk Management Agency (RMA). 
 
The FSA provides direct loans and loan guarantees for farm ownership and operating 
expenses to borrowers who would otherwise be unable to obtain financing. In also operates two 
special programs – one oriented towards under-represented groups (women, African Americans, 
Native Americans, Alaskan Natives, Hispanics, Asians, and Pacific Islanders) and another to 
beginning farmers. Of the total funding of $3.5 billion for FY2004, $128.4 million (about 4 
percent) was authorized for direct farm ownership loans and $614.7 million (about 17 percent) for   9
direct operating loans. The FSA requires all borrowers to complete a farm and financial training 
course, unless they can demonstrate an adequate knowledge and ability in the subject area. FSA 
also requires borrowers to provide information on their financial performance and to participate 
in an annual review. Other conditions are attached to financing, including the requirement for 
borrowers to conduct their operations in an environmentally sound manner, to comply with 
government environmental policies, and to operate according to a USDA land management plan, 
if required. 
 
FSA training is conducted by collaborators often drawn from state extension services. 
The training program typically focuses on key finance topics such as “the balance sheet, income 
statement, cash flow budget, fixing broken farm finances, financial planning… (and) goal-setting 
and decision making methods” (Hanson et al., 1996). An analysis of the use of financial 
information by participating farmers in Kentucky revealed that fewer than 25 percent use a 
system of accounts that make it easy to perform periodic analysis of income and expenses 
(Ibendahl et al., 2002). Analysis of the impact of the training for participating farmers in 
Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania in 1996 suggests that the application of business plans 
developed in the course of training would result in an increase of roughly 4 percent in gross 
income, including income from off-farm sources (Hanson et al., 1998).
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Additional financial training activities are provided through the Risk Management 
Agency (RMA) of USDA under the authority of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 
which required the agency to “…establish a program under which crop insurance education and 
information is provided to producers in States in which (as determined by the Secretary) –  (a) 
there is traditionally, and continues to be, a low level of Federal crop insurance participation and 
availability; and (b) producers are underserved by the Federal crop insurance program.” Fifteen 
states have been identified as being eligible for the program.
9 While the primary emphasis of the 
program is on risk management, it also seeks to improve the financial health of small farms and 
includes training in basic areas, such as the analysis of financial statements and credit 
management (RMA, 2000). The program is funded at a level of $5 million per year. As with the 
FSA program, the training is provided by a range of partners, including staff in state extension 
services. 
 
  These current programs for improving management skills in agriculture are limited in 
scope by being restricted geographically or to certain groups of farmers. Greater market 
orientation will require that farmers be skilled both in production methods and the management of 
the farm business. Work by the USDA has examined the characteristics of top performing small 
farms in the United States. Perry and Johnson (1999) conclude that such farms are characterized 
by three critical management characteristics: cost control; active marketing (the use of hedging or 
futures and options, forward contracting, and spreading sales throughout the year); and the use of 
effective financial strategies (management of cash and credit). Available evidence, although 
limited, suggests that there is a need for additional investment in financial and business 
management training for farmers to further the aim of successful adjustment to policy reform. 
 
Given the growing importance of off-farm income in total farm household income, the 
focus of training for some farmers will certainly be on enhancing skills for off-farm employment. 
The approach adopted in TAA programs, in which financial assistance is provided for those 
undergoing retraining, might well be used to address this issue. Support for retraining would also 
be appropriate for farmers who are not of retirement age, but who choose to exit the industry. 
Farmers approaching retirement might be offered assistance in planning for this. Many of these 
services have traditionally been provided through cooperative extension and the network is 
generally in place to address these needs. Additional Federal funding would need to be provided   10
for program delivery, with the bulk of this being required during the early phase of the 
implementation of policy reform. 
 
  It is difficult to estimate the cost of programs to address human capital issues associated 
with adjustment in agriculture, but this is likely to be modest in comparison to recent annual 
support expenditures. 
 
The Persistent Poverty Issue   
 
  Equity considerations have long been cited as one of the principal justifications for U.S. 
agricultural policies. Numerous books and articles have been written over the years about the 
“farm problem”, i.e., the persistence of low incomes and high poverty rates among farmers. With 
growing diversification in the sources of income of farm households, in particular a large increase 
in the proportion of total income obtained from off-farm sources, these arguments carry less 
weight than before. According to recent USDA data, 95 percent of the aggregate income of U.S. 
farm households was derived from off-farm sources and average household income was 9 percent 
above median U.S. household income in 2000 (McElroy et al., 2003). Over 90 percent of the 
roughly 2.1 million farm operator households in the United States have a net worth above that of 
the median U.S. household. The average net worth for all farm households was roughly $514,000 
in 2000 (Mishra et al., 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, even with measures such as those suggested above to ease adjustment to a 
more market-oriented environment, the persistent low-income problem that characterizes certain 
parts of U.S. agriculture is unlikely to disappear. There may be a case for “safety net” payments 
to address this issue. A study by Gundersen et al. (2000) examined the impact of a range of safety 
net options for U.S. agriculture using historical data for 1993-97 and projections for 1999-2003. 
Their analysis indicates that the distribution of payments would change dramatically if these were 
based on income, expenditure or earnings criteria, with a much larger share of payments being 
directed to “limited resource” farm households.
10   
 
Selected characteristics of limited resource farms (LRFs) are summarized in table 4. 
There are roughly 130 thousand such farms in the United States, representing roughly 6 percent 
of the total number of farms. Less that 20 percent of limited resource farms received government 
payments in 1997 and the average payment per recipient of roughly $2,200 was the lowest among 
the farm types identified by USDA (Gundersen et al., 2000, table 9). From other data in table 4, 
we can see that the operators of LRFs tend to have lower educational levels than those of other 
farms. In 2000 it was estimated that 42 percent of limited resource farm operators had an 
educational level equivalent to “some high school or less” compared to an average of 15 percent 
in that category for all farm households. Just over 50 percent of LRF operators were 65 years or 
older; a percentage only surpassed by farms classified as retirement farms (75 percent).  Limited 
resource farms also had the highest percentage of operators with no spouse (41 percent, compared 
to an average for all farms of 15 percent). The operators of LRFs spend a larger proportion of 
their time working off the farm than the other major classes of farm (excluding 
residential/lifestyle farms for which off-farm work dominates), and the earnings from off-farm 
work are used to offset the losses made from farming.  
 
If we define poverty in terms of both low income and low net worth, it is apparent that 
this is not confined exclusively to LRFs. Despite low incomes, data for 2002 indicate that roughly 
54 percent of LRFs are wealthier than the average U.S. household (imputed from McElroy 2003, 
table 7).
11 USDA data indicate that LRFs make up roughly 38 percent of the total farms that have 
lower incomes and lower wealth than the average U.S. household (table 5). Residential/lifestyle   11
farms make up 33 percent of the total, and farming occupation/lower-sales farms a further 17 
percent. If we were to adopt a target of a minimum income level of $30,000 for farm households 
that fall into the low income/low asset category (the figure used by Gunderson et al., 2000) this 
would require transfer payments of roughly $13,600 per farm or total transfers of $1.8 billion in 
2002.
12 Again this may be compared to $11-23 billion devoted to direct payments per year and 
the total OECD estimate of commodity-based support of roughly $40-$56 billion per year (table 
1). 
 
The use of targeted income support payments is only part of an approach that could be 
adopted for addressing the poverty issue in U.S. agriculture. As may be seen from table 4, some 
poor households may actually be losing money on their farm operations.
13 It would seem that 
there is a role for the expanded human capital activities discussed earlier (managerial training or 




  The adjustment issues associated with policy reform in U.S. agriculture may be addressed 
through a reorientation of existing policies to address three important aspects: 1. reductions in 
asset values; 2. improvements in or reallocation of human capital; and 3. persistent poverty. We 
have used available data to explore these issues and, where possible, to derive some rough 
estimates of costs. These estimates could certainly be improved, and the specifics of program 
design could be examined in greater depth. Overall, it appears that the reorientation of US 
agricultural policies towards facilitating the process of adjustment to change would be much less 
expensive over the longer term than current policies. 
  
  While adjustment to the change that would result from a general reduction in price and 
income support would be a key factor in the design of future US agricultural policies, it is not the 
only factor. The growing recognition of the importance of agriculture in the provision of non-
commodity outputs, particularly environmental goods, also has implications. An assessment of 
the extent to which current programs are effective in achieving environmental objectives or need 
to be modified are outside the scope of this paper, but we recognize the importance of these issues 
for future policies for the sector.    
 
  Despite the limitations of our analysis, we believe that it forms a useful basis for 
considering future directions in U.S. agricultural policy. Whether radical change in the direction 
of policy is likely or feasible is an open question, but as economists we should at least be 
prepared to “think the unthinkable” from time to time. 
   12
Annex. A Brief History of U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance Programs 
 
The 1962 Trade Expansion Act contained provisions for adjustment assistance to firms or 
workers. A firm or group of workers (or their union) could petition the Tariff Commission to 
investigate their eligibility for assistance.
14 In the event that the Commission’s investigation 
proved positive the President could provide an opportunity for firms or workers to apply for aid. 
For firms, such aid could take the form of technical, financial or tax assistance, or some 
combination of these. A firm was required to submit an adjustment proposal for certification by 
the Secretary of Commerce. Certification was dependent on the proposal being judged to 
“materially to contribute to the economic adjustment of the firm”; “give adequate consideration to 
the interest of workers”; and “demonstrate that the firm will make all reasonable efforts to use its 
own resources for economic development.” Technical assistance could also be provided, on a cost 
sharing basis, to enable a firm to prepare its adjustment proposal. Financial assistance, in the form 
of loans or loan guarantees, could be made available for “acquisition, construction, installation, 
modernization, development, conversion, or expansion of land, plant, buildings, equipment, 
facilities or machinery” or in exceptional cases “to supply working capital.” Financial assistance 
could only be provided if this were not available from alternative sources on reasonable terms.   
 
The determination of worker eligibility for adjustment assistance was the responsibility 
of the Secretary of Labor. Such assistance involved the payment of a trade readjustment 
allowance to workers who were judged to be totally or partially separated from employment due 
to import competition.
15 The allowance was 65 percent of the average weekly wage of an 
unemployed worker, up to a maximum of 65 percent of the average weekly manufacturing wage. 
If a worker received some weekly remuneration, the payment was reduced by 50 percent of that 
amount. Workers undergoing on-the-job training were also eligible for payments, although they 
did not need to undergo training to receive benefits. All payments under the legislation were a 
“top up” for those provided through state unemployment insurance programs. Payments were 
limited to 52 weeks, with an additional extension of 26 weeks for a worker undergoing approved 
training, or 13 additional weeks for a worker aged 60 or over at the time of total or partial 
separation. Workers were also eligible for payments to defray transportation and subsistence 
expenses while undergoing retraining, and for relocation. 
 
Payments under TAA are directed through the states, since trade readjustment allowances 
are essentially supplementary unemployment insurance payments. Since the creation of a federal 
unemployment insurance program in 1935, funds for unemployment insurance have been 
channeled through the states.
16 States were also required to provide additional services to 
displaced workers such as testing, counseling, and referral to training and placement services. An 
Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board was created to advise the President on the 
implementation of the policy. The Secretary of Agriculture was one of the members of the Board. 
 
The TAA provisions were modified in the Trade Reform Act of 1974, which provided the 
negotiating authority for Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations. The legislation made it easier to 
qualify for assistance and increased benefits. It also expanded assistance to “trade-impacted” 
communities. The new act made specific reference to “workers in any agricultural firm or 
subdivision of an agricultural firm” as being eligible to apply for adjustment assistance. There 
were no specific references to agriculture in earlier legislation. The Act led to an enormous 
increase in expenditures. Payments to workers alone rose from $79 million in 1975-76 to $1 
billion in 1980. This resulted in a tightening of eligibility criteria and reduction in benefits in the 
1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act (Banks and Tulmir, 1986). The Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 made worker retraining both an entitlement and a requirement for 
receiving income support.   13
 
Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act of 
1993, a specialized TAA program was established, which took effect in 1994. The program was 
designed to provide TAA to firms and workers affected by increased import competition from 
Canada and Mexico. The program provided assistance to workers in so-called “primary” firms 
who lost their jobs either because of increased imports, or because of the relocation of plants to 
those countries. In a major innovation, it also extended coverage to workers in firms who were 
indirectly affected by increased trade with Canada or Mexico. These so-called “secondary” firms 
were either suppliers to primary firms or assemblers of finished components who were affected 
by imports or shifts in production in primary firms. 
 
The current TAA program, defined by the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 
2002, provides assistance to workers and firms. The provisions for firms are simply an extension 
of those in earlier legislation with a maximum of $16 million per year authorized for expenditures 
– a very modest sum. It continues the provisions of the NAFTA program in that those eligible for 
assistance include workers in firms affected by the shift of production to certain overseas 
countries. The legislation limits government financial exposure by specifying that the shift in 
production must be to a country that is party to a free trade agreement with the United States. As 
in the NAFTA TAA program, the Act extends potential eligibility to “secondary workers”, i.e., 
those employed by suppliers or downstream producers (firms performing additional value-added 
processes) to firms who are judged to be eligible for TAA. Again, in order to limit financial 
exposure, in the case of downstream producers, eligibility for TAA is dependent on an increase in 
imports from, or a shift in production, to Canada or Mexico. 
 
The Act increases the period for which support can be paid to workers and increases 
benefits. As in previous legislation, workers are ordinarily required to undergo training to be 
eligible for benefits (within 16 weeks after separation or 8 weeks after certification), but six 
criteria are specified that allow workers to receive support without undergoing training.
17 The Act 
also allows for an extension of the enrollment period for training under extenuating 
circumstances. The legislation strengthens the possibilities for on-the-job training by authorizing 
support for training customized to a specific employer's needs. A cap of $220 million per year is 
specified for training under the program.  
 
There are several increases in worker benefits. The maximum TAA income support 
period is increased from 52 to 78 weeks, which together with 26 weeks of support from 
unemployment insurance provides for a period of potential support of two years. An extra 26 
weeks of support can also be secured by workers whose training includes remedial education. 
Finally, caps on one-time payments for job search and relocation are increased from $800 to 
$1,250. Workers that are 50 years and older can choose, in lieu of other TAA benefits, to receive 
50% of the difference between their new salary and old salary for two years, up to a maximum of 
$10,000 and also may receive health care assistance. Health care assistance, in the form of tax 
credits for the cost of health insurance, is also available to other TAA participants.  
 
TAA for communities, originally introduced in the 1974 act, is not contained in the 
current legislation. The major components of the community provisions were grants for 
conducting strategic planning and economic development projects. 
 
Under the agricultural provisions of the Act, a group of commodity producers or an 
association acting on their behalf, can petition for TAA direct payments. These are triggered if 
the national average price for the commodity (or a class of goods within that commodity) is less 
than 80 percent of the average for the previous five years, and a determination by the   14
International Trade Commission concludes that imports “contributed importantly” to the decline 
in price. The Secretary of Agriculture is required to conduct a study of the number of producers 
likely to be eligible for assistance, and the extent to which adjustment to import competition may 
be facilitated through existing programs. The findings of this study are submitted to the President 
and made public. 
 
In order to be eligible for payments, a producer’s net farm income in the current year (as 
determined by the Secretary) must be less than that in the latest year for which no TAA was paid, 
producers must have met with an extension service employee to obtain technical assistance to 
improve competitiveness in the production and marketing of the affected commodity, and 
information on the feasibility of substituting other commodities for the affected commodity. 
Producers are not eligible for assistance under the program if their average adjusted gross income 
for the previous three years exceeds $2.5 million. Individual producers may be eligible for 
payments of up to $10,000 per year. The size of the payment is calculated as: 0.5 (0.8Pb-Pm) Qp, 
where: Pm is the national average price of the commodity in the most recent marketing year; Pb is 
the national price for the five preceding years; and Qp is the amount of the commodity produced 
by the farmer in the most recent marketing year. TAA payments calculated in this way are also 
counted against the overall maximum of $50,000 per producer for “counter-cyclical” payments 
applied under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002.   15
 
Table 1. Government Support for U.S. Agriculture (billion $) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003P 
Total  direct  payments  12.4 21.5 22.9 20.7 11.0 17.4 
Production flexibility contract  6.0  5.0  4.0  3.4     
Fixed direct payment          0.4  7.7 
Counter-cyclical  payments       0.2  1.9 
Loan  deficiency  1.8 5.9 6.4 5.4 1.3 0.6 
Marketing  loan  gains  0.2 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.7 
Peanut quota buyout payments          1.0  0.3 
Milk income loss payments          0.9  0.9 
Conservation  1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.3 
Ad hoc and emergency  2.8  7.9  8.6  8.5  1.3  3.3 
        
Producer  support  estimate  48.3 55.9 49.7 51.7 39.6 n.a. 
Note: P = preliminary; n.a. = not available. Detail may not add due to rounding 
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA and OECD. 
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Figure 2. Average Value of U.S. Farmland per Acre Compared to Changes in U.S. Producer and 



















Table 2. Increase in U.S. Cropland Value Attributable to Commodity Program Payments, 2000 
Region  Total value of 










land owned by 
nonoperator 
landlords 
  $ billion  $ billion  Percent  Percent 
Heartland 167.3  40.2 24  63 
Prairie Gateway  41.7  9.4  23  65 
Mississippi 
Portal 
17.3 2.7  16  75 
Northern Great 
Plains 
11.3 2.5  22  53 
Fruitful Rim  21.6  2.2  10  53 
Northern 
Crescent 
26.0 1.9  8  53 
Southern 
Seaboard 
18.2 1.8  10  53 
Eastern Uplands  4.6  0.5  10  39 
Basin and Range  4.2  0.4  10  61 
United States  312.3  61.6  20  62 
     
Source: Barnard et al. (2002)   19
 
Table 3. Estimate of the Capitalized Value of U.S. Government Support Programs for Agriculture 










Major field crops (1)  17.3  61.6 (3)  3.6 (4) 
Other products (2)  26.4  46.9 (6)  1.8 (5) 
Total 43.6  108.5  2.5 
      
Notes:  
(1) wheat, corn, other coarse grains, rice, oilseeds and cotton; cotton estimate derived by applying 
percentage PSE for crops covered by the OECD to the value of cotton production from USDA 
(2) all other supported products including milk and sugar 
(3) from Barnard et al. (2002) 
(4) figure in column B divided by figure in column A 
(5) based on an assumed transfer efficiency of support of 50 percent of that for major field crops 
from OECD (2003). 
(6) figure in column A multiplied by that in column C 
Source: Based upon data from OECD and USDA 
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Table 4. Selected Characteristics of Limited Resource Farms in 2000 
  Limited Resource Farms  All U.S. 
Farms 
Number of farms (1)              129,810  2,121,576 
Percentage of total farms (1)  6.1  100.0 
    
Percent of operators who are: (1)     
65 years or older   50.2  26.6 
with some high school education or less   42.1  15.1 
Male 73.7  90.4 
without a spouse  40.7  14.9 
    
Operator hours worked: (2)     
On farm  958  1,809 (a) 
Off farm  463  281 (a) 
Percent off farm  48.3  15.5 (a) 
    
Share of off-farm income in total household income (4)  137.5 (b)  90.1 (b) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses relate to the table number in the appendix of the source. 
(a)  excluding residential/lifestyle farms for which work off the farm accounts for more than 
80 percent of the total hours worked 
(b) data for 1999 
Sources: Mishra et al. (2002) 
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Table 5. Estimates of Income Support for Low-income/Low-wealth U.S. Farm Households in 
2002 
  
Number of farms (1)  130,485 
Percent of total number of farms  6.2 
   
Distribution by farm type (percent):   
Limited resource  37.5 
Residential/lifestyle 33.0 
Farming occupation/low sales  16.8 
Other 12.7 
   
Income and payments per farm ($):   
Average government payment  2,091 
Farm income  -7,762 
Off-farm Income  24,080 
Farm household income  16,409 
Payment required to meet $30,000 income target  13,591 
   
Total payments required  to meet income target (billion $)  1.77 
   
(1) farm households with lower income and lower wealth than the median U.S. household 
Source: Based upon data from McElroy et al. (2003), table 7   22
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 Endnotes 
                                                      
1 David Blandford is a Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at The 
Pennsylvania State University and Richard Boisvert is a Professor in the Department of Applied Economics 
and Management at Cornell University. Paper presented at the International Agricultural Trade Research 
Consortium Symposium entitled “Adjusting to Domestic and International Agricultural Policy Reform in 
Industrial Countries” held in Philadelphia, June 6-7, 2004.  
2 The Resettlement Administration, subsequently the Farm Security Administration, purchased large farms 
for division and sale as smaller economically viable units; purchased and amalgamated small farms for 
sale; resettled farmers and their families from whom farms had been purchased; and provided investment 
loans and grants. The Farmers Home Administration (FHA), the predecessor of the current Farm Service 
Agency (FSA), was created in 1946 with a more limited role of providing loans and technical business 
assistance to farmers, particularly those unable to obtain financing from commercial lenders. A Rural 
Development Program with ambitious economic adjustment objectives was launched under the Eisenhower 
Administration but with limited funding ($2 million) and had little impact (Cochrane, 1965). Rural 
development efforts continued under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations but without any significant 
increase in resources. A Rural Community Development Service was formed as part of the USDA in 1965. 
In 1972, the Rural Development Act was passed which consolidated Federal rural development programs 
under a single piece of legislation and provides the current authority for USDA agricultural and lending 
programs. Subsequent farm bills have amended the legislation but have continued the tradition of modest 
funding.  
3 A report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) indicates that farmers are not excluded from pre-
existing benefits under TAA and NAFTA-TAA, although it does not discuss how these benefits would 
apply. See GAO, table 5. 
4 The USDA defines a set of Farm Resource Regions that reflect geographic specialization in production in 
the United States. The Heartland region has the most farms, highest value of production, and the most 
cropland and is dominated by cash grain and cattle farms. It is comprised of the states of Illinois, Indiana, 
and Iowa and parts of Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota. 
5 USDA data on farmland ownership for 1999 indicate that people 65 years and older own 63 percent of the 
farmland controlled by non-operators. Since non-operators own 62 percent of total farmland (table 2), 
roughly 40 percent of farmland is owned by people of retirement age. 
6 The analysis of Barnard et al. deals only with the impact of the major types of direct payments provided to 
agriculture. It does not address the impact of other programs, such as those for milk and sugar. Those 
programs rely primarily on price supports. It has been argued elsewhere that the income transfer efficiency 
of such measures is far lower, primarily because farmers must supply a product to receive the benefits of 
price support, and they incur significant costs in doing so (Blandford and Dewbre 1994).  The average 
support provided to the major field crops covered in the Barnard et al. study averaged roughly $17 billion 
from 1996-2002, and that provided to other products was roughly $26 billion (table 3). If we take the 
capitalization figure obtained by Barnard et al. as a base, this implies a capitalization ratio of roughly 3.5 
(the proportionate increase in land values relative to support). A recent OECD study (OECD 2003) 
suggests that the transfer efficiency of the types of direct payments that make up most of the support for 
field crops in the United States is roughly twice as high as that for the price supports that are more 
important for other products (such as milk and sugar). Use of that assumption yields an estimate of the 
capitalized value of support of roughly $46 billion for land used in other products. Note that the OECD 
estimates for support include payments under environmental programs. As we argue, these would not 
necessarily be eliminated under policy reform and consequently their value should be excluded from the 
compensation calculations. 
7 California is the one state in which this task could be simplified because its dairy program includes a pool 
quota which determines the pool price paid to each farmer on the amount of the quota the farmer owns 
relative to the amount of the milk marketed. Wilson and Sumner (2004) have examined the factors that 
drive the variation in the California dairy quota over a 29-year period.  
8 Interestingly the financial impact was not found to differ by the level of education of participants. The 
authors observe that “the workshops achieved substantial impact at all levels of educational attainment.” 
9 These are twelve states in the Northeast/Mid-Atlantic region (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont 
and West Virginia) and three western states (Nevada, Utah and Wyoming).   25
                                                                                                                                                              
10 These are farms with gross sales of less than $100,000, total farm assets of less than $150,000, and total 
operator household income of less than $20,000. 
11 These data indicate that LRFs make up roughly 38 percent of the total farms that have lower incomes and 
lower wealth than the average U.S. household. Retirement farms make up 33 percent of the total, and 
farming occupation/lower-sales farms are 17 percent. These data indicate that low incomes and limited 
asset values are not confined exclusively to limited-resource farms. 
12 This is not an exceptionally large figure. Gunderson et al. 2000 note that the average large family farm 
received program payments of $18,000 in 1997. 
13 Tax management strategies can play a part in the measurement of income derived from farming. The 
reduction of tax liability is likely to be of greater importance for farms that appear to generate a low income 
from a high value of sales. These are not included in the category of farms considered here. 
14 The Tariff Commission was established by Congress in 1916. Its name was changed to the U.S. 
International Trade Commission in the Trade Act of 1974. The role of the Commission is to investigate 
trade issues and to report on these to the President and the Congress in order to inform trade policy. 
15 Partial separation was defined as a reduction in hours of work to 80 percent or less of previous weekly 
hours worked, or a reduction in wages to 75 percent or less of prior average weekly wage. 
16 A key factor shaping the federal legislation was the possibility of legal challenges to the constitutionality 
of a program in this area through the Supreme Court. It was this possibility that resulted in most of the 
detail of the implementation of the program being devolved to the states. 
17 These are: recall to work; possession of marketable skills; approaching retirement; health reasons; 
enrolment unavailable; training not available. 